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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Libertarian constitutional thought is a distinctly minority position among 
scholars and jurists—one that, at first glance, has little in common with either 
modern Supreme Court jurisprudence or the liberalism that dominates the legal 
academy. However, libertarian ideas have had greater influence on 
constitutional law than first meets the eye. 
This article explores the connections between mainstream and libertarian 
constitutional thought in recent decades. On a number of important issues, 
modern Supreme Court doctrine and liberal constitutional thought have been 
significantly influenced by pre–New Deal libertarian (or “classical liberal”) 
ideas, even if the influence is often overlooked by observers or unknown to 
those influenced. This is particularly true on issues of equal protection and 
modern “substantive” due process as it pertains to “noneconomic” rights. Here, 
both the Supreme Court and mainstream academics have repudiated early 
twentieth-century Progressivism’s advocacy of strict judicial deference to 
legislatures. They have also rejected efforts to eliminate common-law and 
market-oriented “baselines” for constitutional rights. 
The gap between libertarian and mainstream constitutional thought is much 
greater on issues of federalism and property rights. Here too, however, recent 
decades have seen a degree of convergence. Over the last thirty years it has 
become intellectually respectable to support stronger judicial protection for 
property rights and federalism. The Supreme Court has become increasingly 
willing to protect property rights and to enforce limits on federal power. 
Before proceeding, it is worth briefly defining what we mean by 
“libertarian” and “mainstream” constitutional thought. By “libertarian,” we 
mean the idea that there should be significant constitutional limits on 
government in order to protect both “economic” and “noneconomic” rights. 
Given that constitutional rights are most often vindicated in modern America 
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through judicial review, most libertarian constitutionalists believe that the 
courts should enforce these rights. Libertarian jurists and legal scholars also 
often advocate strong judicial enforcement of federalism and separation of 
powers limits on government power, in part because they provide important 
indirect protection for individual freedom. 
This relatively broad definition of libertarian constitutional thought is 
necessarily oversimplified. It abstracts away from some important internal 
disagreements among libertarians. For example, it overlooks the important 
distinction between libertarian constitutional theorists who embrace originalism 
and those who do not.1 It also does not consider the distinction between 
utilitarian libertarians and those who emphasize natural rights. But, for our 
purposes, we believe it effectively captures the core of modern libertarian 
constitutional thought, as exemplified by leading scholars such as Richard 
Epstein and Randy Barnett.2 
Defining the constitutional mainstream is perhaps even more difficult than 
defining libertarianism. Here, we use it to indicate the dominant strains in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence and academic constitutional thought since World 
War II. Obviously, mainstream jurists and legal scholars disagree among 
themselves on many issues. But they also share core assumptions, such as the 
need for strong judicial review to protect important noneconomic freedoms and 
to prevent invidious discrimination by government. Other ideas, such as 
advocacy of judicial intervention to enforce federalism and property rights, are 
part of mainstream discourse, although they are hotly contested. As we discuss 
below, libertarian constitutional thought has significantly influenced both 
consensus and disputed mainstream views. 
II 
THE PRE–NEW DEAL LIBERTARIAN ROOTS OF MODERN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Even during the heyday of modern liberal American constitutionalism, 
classical-liberal thought and doctrine significantly influenced American 
constitutional law. Indeed, there are substantial continuities between 
constitutional law in the pre–New Deal period and constitutional law as it 
developed after World War II. 
Pre–New Deal constitutionalism is often referred to as conservative (or even 
reactionary).3 In general, however, it was based on classical liberal premises—
 
 1.  For an example of nonoriginalist libertarian constitutional theory, see Tom W. Bell, The 
Constitution as if Consent Mattered, 16 CHAPMAN L. REV. 269 (2013). 
 2.  For the most comprehensive recent statements of their views, see RANDY E. BARNETT, 
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (rev. ed. 2013); RICHARD A. 
EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR LIMITED 
GOVERNMENT (2013). 
 3.  See KERMIT. L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR 226 (1989) (explaining that this is how the 
jurisprudence of the so-called “Lochner era” is often viewed). We do not  use the phrase  “Lochner 
era,” because it is anachronistic, fails to reflect the nuances of the period, and wildly overstates the 
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limited government, individual rights, and the rule of law—that still dominate 
constitutional law today. Despite successive challenges to constitutional law’s 
liberalism from sociological jurisprudence, legal realism, critical legal studies, 
and other schools of thought, constitutional law still retains the same basic 
liberal contours it had in the 1910s. Some important examples of the liberal 
underpinnings of modern constitutional law include: (1) the federal judiciary’s 
continued crucial role in maintaining the constitutional order through judicial 
review; (2) government inaction is still the baseline by which government 
actions that may violate rights are judged; (3) property and liberty are still 
considered coherent, judicially protectable concepts; and (4) the state action 
doctrine still defines the scope of constitutional rights. Although Americans 
today generally accept these elements of modern constitutional law as simply 
the natural order of things, they all faced strong intellectual and political 
challenges starting in the Progressive era. 
The first challenge to the pre–New Deal constitutional order came from the 
early twentieth-century Progressives. Many leading Progressives perceived 
American “individualism” to be the primary barrier to their success. 
Individualism was shorthand for a legal and political system focused on 
individual rights, especially property and contract rights.4 Progressives at that 
time tended to be “small d” democrats and favored lodging administrative 
power and discretion in expert government agencies. Not surprisingly, many 
Progressives were very skeptical of—even hostile to—review of constitutional 
rights claims by an appointed judiciary with little expertise on the underlying 
policy issues. 
This skepticism meshed nicely with, and was in part inspired by, the views of 
Harvard Law School Professor James B. Thayer. He argued that courts should 
only invalidate legislation “when those who have the right to make laws have 
not merely made a mistake, but have made a very clear one,—so clear that it is 
not open to rational question.”5 Thayer influenced entire generations of 
Progressive lawyers, including Louis Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter.6 Brandeis 
grew so disgusted with what he considered to be “conservative” abuse of 
judicial review that he wanted to repeal the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, leaving no clear avenue for the 
protection of constitutional rights against the states.7 His protégé, Frankfurter, 
along with Learned Hand, would have been satisfied with abolishing only the 
 
importance of Lochner v. New York at the time. See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING 
LOCHNER (2011). 
 4.  See, e.g., GEORGE W. ALGER, THE OLD LAW AND THE NEW ORDER 241 (1913); Richard T. 
Ely, Economic Theory and Labor Legislation, 9 AM. ECON. ASS’N. Q. 124, 146 (1908).  
 5.  James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 
HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893). 
 6.  See Wallace Mendelson, The Influence of James B. Thayer upon the Work of Holmes, 
Brandeis, and Frankfurter, 31 VAND. L. REV. 71, 73 (1978); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Learned Hand: The 
Jurisprudential Trajectory of an Old Progressive, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 873, 874, 885 (1995). 
 7.  Melvin I. Urofsky, The Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, 1985 SUP. CT. REV.  299, 318, 325. 
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Due Process Clause.8 Oliver Wendell Holmes, the great hero of Progressive 
legal intellectuals in the 1910s and 1920s (though not a Progressive himself), at 
times seemed to want to virtually abolish the judicial role in protecting 
constitutional rights.9 Beyond Progressive jurists, various Progressive writers,10 
intellectuals, and politicians, including Theodore Roosevelt,11 Senator William 
Borah,12 and Senator Robert LaFollete,13 sought in the 1910s and early 1920s to 
severely limit judicial independence and the power of judicial review. 
Robert Hale and other early legal realists continued the Progressives’ 
assault on constitutional protections for individual rights by attacking the very 
notion of rights against government coercion in the early 1920s.14 According to 
this line of thinking, a fixed amount of coercion exists. If courts were to restrain 
the government from taking an action—say, segregating residential 
neighborhoods by law—the courts would be stopping the government from 
forcing those who prefer integration to segregate. At the same time, the courts 
would be “coercing” those who prefer segregation by preventing them from 
enforcing that preference through legislation.15 
 
 8.  See Frankfurter, The Red Terror of Judicial Reform, unsigned editorial, 40 NEW REPUBLIC 
110, 113 (1924); Hand, An Unseen Reversal, unsigned editorial, NEW REPUBLIC 7, 7–8 ( 1915). 
 9.  E.g., Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 111 (1911) (stating the states’ police power 
may be used “in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and 
preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare.”); Lochner v. New 
York, 198 U.S. 45, 75–76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“I think that the word liberty in the 
Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant 
opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute 
proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our 
people and our law.”); KEN I. KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES: DISCONTINUITIES IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 151 (2004) (quoting Holmes as arguing that “a 
law should be called good if it reflects the will of the dominant forces of the community, even if it takes 
us all to hell.”). For a humorous take, see H.L. Mencken, Mr. Justice Holmes, AM. MERCURY, May 
1930, at 123 (suggesting that if Holmes’s judicial opinions “were accepted literally, there would be 
scarcely any brake at all upon lawmaking, and the Bill of Rights would have no more significance than 
the Code of Manu”). 
 10.  See, e.g., WILLIAM L. RANSOM, MAJORITY RULE AND THE JUDICIARY ch. VIII (1912) 
(supporting Theodore Roosevelt’s proposal that judicial decisions by subject to “popular recall”); 
GILBERT E. ROE, OUR JUDICIAL OLIGARCHY 212–24 (1912) (calling for popular recall of judges to 
encourage them to act more reasonably). 
 11.  In his 1912 campaign for president, Roosevelt advocated allowing state voters to “recall” state 
supreme court judicial decisions that they opposed. Theodore Roosevelt, A Charter of Democracy: 
Address Before the Ohio Constitutional Convention, THE OUTLOOK, Feb. 24, 1912, at 390. Obviously, 
this would have been a precedent for similar federal action.  
 12.  Borah argued that it should take a 7-2 majority of the Supreme Court to invalidate legislation. 
64 Cong. Rec. 3959 (1923).  
 13.  LaFollette, while running a vigorous Progressive Party campaign in 1924, promised direct 
election of federal judges and enabling Congress to overturn Supreme Court decisions. KENNETH 
CAMPBELL MACKAY, PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT 11, 144 (1947); WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY: 
POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES AND LABOR UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890–1937 193–217 (1994). 
See also 62 Cong. Rec. 9076 (1922) (reprinting LaFollette speech calling for a ban on lower federal 
court’s invalidating laws, and for Congress to have the authority to overturn Supreme Court decisions). 
 14.  Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in the Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. 
Q. 470 (1923). See also NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 107–11. 
 15.  Se HOWARD LEE MCBAIN, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 78 (1927) (criticizing the Supreme 
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Once Progressive and modern liberal Justices took control of the Supreme 
Court, the Court had the opportunity to enforce judicial restraint. The Court, 
however, rejected both the Progressives’ devotion to strict judicial restraint and 
the realists’ suggestion that rights are illusory. Moreover, despite several 
dalliances with the contrary perspective,16 the Court ultimately continued to 
require that Fourteenth Amendment claims be based only on government, and 
not private action. And despite one significant step in the direction of 
recognizing positive rights via the “new property,”17 the idea that the 
Constitution is a “charter of negative liberties”18 has survived. 
Instead of adopting the Progressive and legal realist critique of rights-based 
liberalism, the Supreme Court gradually invented modern constitutional 
liberalism. Although the Court’s constitutional priorities shifted away from 
defending federalism, property rights, and contractual rights in favor of the sort 
of jurisprudence defended in and advocated by John Hart Ely’s Democracy and 
Distrust, the basic contours of liberal constitutionalism remained. Thus the 
Court, instead of abandoning jurisprudential liberalism, reshaped it to suit the 
sort of liberalism that dominated New Deal and post–New Deal thinking. 
Eventually, the dominance of post–New Deal constitutional liberalism 
during the Warren Court era provoked two significant counter-reactions. From 
the right, conservatives, distressed by what they saw as the Court’s “activist” 
invention of new rights, adopted the old Progressive mantra of judicial restraint. 
Robert Bork, for example, adopted the “neutral principles” argument 
(in)famously made by the Progressive scholar Herbert Wechsler in the context 
of school desegregation19 and applied it to First Amendment jurisprudence.20 He 
concluded that the Warren Court had engaged in significant overreach in its 
First Amendment jurisprudence.21 
From the left, critical legal studies theorists, commonly known as “crits,” 
questioned the coherence and justness of a constitutional system built on liberal 
pillars. Mark Tushnet, one of the crits’ brightest constitutional stars, argued that 
rights-based jurisprudence is unstable, indeterminate, and, ultimately, 
 
Court for invalidating residential segregation ordinances, and thus violating whites’ right to live in 
segregated neighborhoods).  These ideas continued to have force in circles though at least the late 
1950s.  See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 
1 (1959) (claiming that he could not distinguish, on a principled basis, between the right of blacks to 
attend an integrated public schools and the right of whites to attend segregated schools). Wechsler went 
to law school in Columbia in the 1920s, when it was a center of Progressive legal thought. 
 16.  See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) for the most significant example.  
 17.  See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that a denial of government welfare 
benefits could be a violation of the Due Process Clause because such benefits should be deemed 
“property” protected by the Clause).  
 18.  Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 19.  See generally Wechsler, supra note 15. 
 20.  Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 22 
(1971). 
 21.  Id. 
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reactionary.22 He summed up the antagonistic relationship between 
constitutional liberalism and critical legal studies succinctly: “Critical legal 
studies . . . is not committed at any level to liberalism.”23 
Critical legal studies has also influenced some leading legal scholars 
associated with mainstream liberalism, such as Cass Sunstein. Sunstein famously 
argued that the Supreme Court should cease repeating what he deemed to be 
Lochner’s mistake: using common-law baselines to determine the existence and 
scope of constitutional rights.24 By common-law baselines, Sunstein did not 
mean the actual common law, but rather a stylized common law that treats 
private-market decisionmaking as the appropriate baseline for legal 
decisionmaking.25 Critical legal studies was also important in the development 
of critical race theory, whose advocates became leading voices favoring such 
illiberal26 constitutional ideas as limiting the First Amendment so that the 
government may prohibit hate speech.27 Critical race theory advocates also 
favored interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal 
protection of the law as solely a guarantee of group “antisubordination” and 
not as a guarantee of an individual right to fair treatment by government.28 
Despite all of this intellectual tumult, constitutional liberalism has survived 
and thrived. Conservatives these days are less inclined to channel old 
Progressive views about judicial restraint, and they are more inclined to speak 
of the necessity of courts enforcing the original meaning of the Constitution. 
Critical legal studies mostly disintegrated in the early 1990s,29 and a form of 
originalism has even taken hold in some intellectual precincts that might once 
have been attracted to critical legal studies.30 Attempts to get the Supreme 
Court to abolish the state action doctrine, to go beyond token recognition of the 
“New Property,” to allow restrictions on hate speech, or even to reduce the 
 
 22.  Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1363–64 (1984). See also Duncan 
Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 178 
(Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002).  
 23.  Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law: An Essay in Deconstruction, 36  
STAN. L. REV. 623, 627 (1984).  
 24.  See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987).  
 25.  See David E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy's Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1, 11 (2003). 
 26.  CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE 1 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, eds., 
1st ed.1995) (noting critical race theory’s “discontent with liberalism”).  
 27.  E.g., MARI J. MATSUDA, ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, 
ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993).  
 28.  See, e.g., CHARLES LAWRENCE & MARI J. MATSUDA, WE WON’T GO BACK: MAKING THE 
CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1997); Charles R. Lawrence III, Two Rivers of the River: A Critique 
of the Liberal Defense of Affirmative Action, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 928, 951 (2001) (arguing that the 
Equal Protection Clause mandates “ridding society of racial subordination” and not “mandating equal 
treatment as an individual right”); Athena D. Mutua, The Rise, Development, and Future Directions of 
Critical Race Theory and Related Scholarship, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 329, 336 (2006) (stating “Critical 
Race Theory’s , , , stance is one of ‘antisubordination”’). 
 29.  See Peter Goodrich, Sleeping With the Enemy: An Essay on the Politics of Critical Legal Studies 
in America, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 389, 390 (1993). 
 30.  See generally JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011). 
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level of review for government affirmative action preferences to something less 
than strict scrutiny all have failed. 
Moreover, it is not just the general contours of modern constitutional 
jurisprudence, but some of the Supreme Court’s specific doctrines that are 
direct descendants of the classical-liberal jurisprudence of the early twentieth 
century. Modern constitutional jurisprudence, shaped to a large extent by the 
liberal Warren and Burger Courts, is, to a great extent, a synthesis of early 
twentieth-century Progressivism and conservative classical liberalism of the 
same period. Modern doctrine reflects Progressive fondness for government 
economic regulation and expansion of federal responsibilities to set national 
standards. But it also retains classical-liberal support for individual rights and 
skepticism towards the arbitrary use of government power, reflected in the pre–
New Deal equal protection and due process cases involving both economic and 
noneconomic rights claims.31 
III 
EQUAL PROTECTION 
Despite signs of doctrinal instability,32 black-letter law still holds that, under 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, three tiers of scrutiny 
exist. Laws challenged as discrimination based on race or alienage receive strict 
scrutiny, laws challenged as discrimination based on sex or legitimacy receive 
intermediate scrutiny, and all other claims of discrimination result in rational 
basis scrutiny. 
Generations of law students have undoubtedly wondered where these tiers 
of scrutiny come from given that they are nowhere to be found in the text of the 
Constitution. And one might wonder whether they have any relationship to 
pre–New Deal equal protection jurisprudence, which, at least formally, treated 
all equal protection claims with the same level of scrutiny. In fact, there is a 
great deal of continuity between pre–New Deal doctrine and modern equal 
protection doctrine, and the existence of the tiers of scrutiny becomes more 
understandable once one studies the history of the Supreme Court’s equal 
protection jurisprudence. 
Opposition to “class legislation,” that is, legislation that classifies on an 
arbitrary basis,33 had deep roots in pre–Civil War American thought34 and, after 
the Civil War, quickly became an interpretive focal point of the Fourteenth 
 
 31.  See David E. Bernstein, The Conservative Origins of Strict Scrutiny, 19 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 
861, 864 (2012); David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of 
Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 11–12 (2003) [hereinafter Bernstein, Lochner 
Era Revisionism, Revised].  
 32.  See infra notes 62–65.  
 33.  Arbitrary legislation, as one contemporary scholar pointed out, meant “oppressive or unjust or 
not based upon a sufficient reason.”  Robert P. Reeder, Is Unreasonable Legislation Unconstitutional?, 
62 U. PA. L. REV. 191, 192 (1913). 
 34.  See generally HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF 
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993). 
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Amendment.35 For example, in his influential concurring opinion in Butchers’ 
Union v. Crescent City,36 Justice Stephen Field stated that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was “designed to prevent all discriminating legislation for the 
benefit of some to the disparagement of others” and that the Amendment 
“inhibit[ed] discriminating and partial enactments, favoring some to the 
impairment of the rights of others.”37 The Supreme Court’s opinions were 
initially unclear on whether the ban on class legislation found its textual support 
in the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, or both. The language 
of the Equal Protection Clause, however, seems better suited for class 
legislation analysis, and the Court eventually used that clause as the primary 
textual basis for class legislation cases.38 
The obvious problem with a ban on class legislation is that no law affects 
everyone exactly the same way, and differentiating between arbitrary and non-
arbitrary classifications is difficult. Nor are courts, as nonparticipants in the 
legislative process, in a particularly good position to draw the relevant 
distinctions. As a result, in 1884, the Court strictly qualified the ban on class 
legislation, explaining that the unconstitutionality of class legislation did not 
preclude all special or partial legislation.39 The Court added that “[s]pecial 
burdens are often necessary for general benefits,—for supplying water, 
preventing fires, lighting districts, cleaning streets, opening parks, and many 
other objects.”40 Although “[r]egulations for these purposes may press with 
more or less weight upon one than upon another,” they are constitutional 
because they are “designed, not to impose unequal or unnecessary restrictions 
upon any one, but to promote, with as little inconvenience as possible, the 
general good.”41 
In 1888, the Supreme Court again emphasized the narrow reach of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition on class legislation.42 The Court 
unanimously rejected the argument “that legislation which is special in its 
character is necessarily within the constitutional inhibition.”43 Justice Field 
explained, “nothing can be further from the fact. The greater part of all 
legislation is special, either in the object sought to be attained by it, or in the 
 
 35.  See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH 
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 459 (3d ed. 1874) 
(“[E]very one has a right to demand that he be governed by general rules.”); id. at 466 (“[T]he same 
securities which one citizen may demand, all others are entitled to.”). 
 36.  Butchers’ Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 758 (1884) (Field, J., concurring). 
 37.  Id. at 759. 
 38.  See RODNEY L. MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW; A HISTORICAL AND ANALYTICAL TREATISE 
ON THE PRINCIPLES AND METHODS FOLLOWED BY THE COURTS IN THE APPLICATION OF THE 
CONCEPT OF THE “LAW OF THE LAND” 277–78 (1926); Victoria F. Nourse & Sarah A. Maguire, The 
Lost History of Governance and Equal Protection, 58 DUKE L.J. 955 (2009).  
 39.  See MOTT, supra note 38, at 31–32. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  See generally Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U.S. 205 (1888). 
 43.  Id. at 209. 
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extent of its application.”44 Special legislation is not illicit class legislation “if all 
persons brought under its influence are treated alike under the same 
conditions.”45 
Although the Court occasionally overturned as illicit class legislation 
legislative classifications that seemed patently discriminatory and that lacked 
any valid justification,46 such decisions were relatively rare. Meanwhile, the 
Court upheld several laws that seemed very plausible candidates for 
condemnation as class legislation,47 including laws requiring racial segregation. 
Racial classifications were treated with no more skepticism than were other 
classifications, and given the racism of the time, the Court was not prepared to 
condemn racial classifications as inherently arbitrary.48 
In Plessy v. Ferguson,49 for example, the Court infamously argued that the 
segregation law at issue was not arbitrary discriminatory class legislation 
because it followed the “established usages, customs, and traditions of the 
people,”50 and was passed “with a view to the promotion of their comfort, and 
the preservation of the public peace and good order.”51 Given “racial instincts,” 
segregating whites and African Americans was a reasonable legislative 
classification, and not class legislation, because a “statute which implies merely 
a legal distinction . . . has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two 
 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  See, e.g., Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902) (invalidating an antitrust law 
that exempted only farmers and ranchers); Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79, 114–15 
(1901) (Harlan, J., concurring for six Justices) (invalidating a state statute that regulated rates for some 
stockyard companies but not for others); Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897) 
(invalidating a law that allowed plaintiffs with small claims against railroads to recover attorneys’ fees if 
the railroad initially refused to pay the claim and then lost at trial).  
 47.  See, e.g., Am. Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89, 92, 95 (1900) (upholding an exemption 
for planters and farmers from a tax on the refining of sugar as a reasonable classification and finding 
that the law was “obviously intended as an encouragement to agriculture” but was not “pure 
favoritism”); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96, 104 (1899).  
 48.  CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 80 
(1987) (“[T]he approach that the Court took to state economic and social regulations paralleled and 
anticipated its treatment of restrictions on blacks”). See Richard S. Kay, The Equal Protection Clause in 
the Supreme Court: 1873–1903, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 667, 696 (1980) (concluding that during this period, 
“the objection to discrimination on grounds of race may be merely a special case of the objection to 
classifications not reasonably related to a police power objective”). The Court, however, did hold that 
the discriminatory enforcement of facially neutral legislation can constitute illicit arbitrary 
discrimination on the basis of race and alienage.  See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886).  
The fact of this discrimination is admitted. No reason for it is shown, and the conclusion 
cannot be resisted that no reason for it exists except hostility to the race and nationality to 
which the petitioners belong, and which, in the eye of the law, is not justified. The 
discrimination is, therefore, illegal, and the public administration which enforces it is a denial 
of the equal protection of the laws and a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution.  
Id. Unlike the modern Supreme Court, however, at the time, Supreme Court doctrine held that the 
Court would not inquire into legislative motive. See Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885). 
 49.  163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 50.  Id. at 550.  
 51.  Id. 
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races.”52 The pre–New Deal Supreme Court also routinely upheld sex 
classifications against equal protection challenges.53 
The Court, meanwhile, rejected more aggressive state-court decisions, such 
as those holding that “truck acts”54 and laws restricting women’s hours of labor55 
were illicit class legislation. By the time the so-called Lochner era was nearing 
its end in the 1930s, the Court limited its rulings holding legislation to be 
unconstitutional “class legislation” primarily to cases involving seemingly 
arbitrary differential tax burdens.56 
When liberals formed a new majority on the Supreme Court beginning in 
the late 1930s, they stopped using the Equal Protection Clause to protect 
economic interests57 when there was no evidence of invidious discrimination 
against a minority group. Contrary to Justice Brandeis’s wishes, however, the 
Equal Protection Clause hardly faded into oblivion. The first hint of resilience 
came in United States v. Carolene Products.58 There, the Supreme Court, 
signaling its eventual withdrawal from serious review of ordinary economic 
regulation, held that such regulations pass constitutional muster if they pass a 
“rational basis” test.59 But in the famous footnote four, the Court also suggested 
that a “more searching judicial inquiry” might be needed when legislation is 
motivated by “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities.”60 
Eventually, concern for the rights of minorities led to the three-tier test we 
are familiar with today. This test is broadly consistent with the concern for class 
legislation that motivated pre–New Deal equal protection jurisprudence. It can 
 
 52.  Id. at 543. 
 53.  The key precedent was Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). The one exception was Adkins 
v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), in which the Court invalidated a D.C. minimum wage law for 
women because it violated a woman’s right to liberty of contract. The Court distinguished earlier cases 
involving maximum hours, night work, and other restrictions on women’s labor on the grounds that, 
although there are real physical differences between men and women, the latter are no less capable of 
bargaining for fair wages than are the former. 
 54.  Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U.S. 13, 22 (1901). For prior state court decisions 
invalidating truck acts, see State v. Loomis, 22 S.W. 350, 353 (Mo. 1893); State v. Goodwill, 10 S.E. 285, 
288 (W. Va. 1889). See also Godcharles v. Wigeman, 6 A. 354 (Pa. 1886). 
 55.  Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908). State cases holding such laws unconstitutional 
included People v. Williams, 189 N.Y. 131, 136–37 (1907); Burcher v. People, 41 Colo. 495, 503–04 
(1907); Ritchie v. People, 40 N.E. 454, 456 (1895). 
 56.  See, e.g., Hartford Co. v. Harrison, 301 U.S. 459 (1937); Valentine v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea 
Co., 299 U.S. 32 (1936); Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550 (1935) (invalidating a graduated 
sales tax that applied a higher rate to larger merchants); Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933) 
(overturning a graduated retail sales tax that rose with the number of stores a chain store company 
owned); Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931); Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389 
(1928) (holding that a statute taxing corporations that owned cabs, but not individual owners, violated 
the Equal Protection Clause); F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920). 
 57.  E.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963). Ferguson was unanimous. By contract, in 
1947 some of the Justices were still willing to countenance Equal Protection challenges to economic 
regulation. See Kotch v. Bd. of River Port Pilot Comm’rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947) (rejecting an equal 
protection claim to a nepotistic licensing law by a 5-4 vote). 
 58.  United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 59.  Id. at 152. 
 60.  Id. at 152 n.4.  
BERNSTEIN_SOMIN_EIC (DO NOT DELETE) 1/31/2015  12:14 PM 
No. 4 2014] THE MAINSTREAMING OF LIBERTARIAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 53 
be explained in these terms: the Equal Protection Clause bans arbitrary 
classifications. The judiciary has neither the mandate nor the expertise to 
determine whether each piece of legislation that might be challenged involves 
an arbitrary or non-arbitrary classification. Instead, the courts use heuristics. 
They utilize a strong presumption that classifications, in general, are legitimate. 
A classification by race or alienage, however, raises the suspicion that the 
classification is arbitrary. Being a resident alien or a member of a racial class 
seems like an inherently arbitrary reason for classification, and such 
classifications are especially likely to result from prejudice rather than a 
reasoned attempt to serve the public good. Therefore, such classifications are 
presumptively invalid and can survive only if they pass “strict scrutiny” review. 
Similarly, given the long history of unjust and arbitrary discrimination against 
women, the courts have reason to suspect the legitimacy of classifications by 
sex. But because men and women, unlike whites and blacks, are intrinsically 
different in some important ways, a midlevel standard of review, instead of 
strict scrutiny, has been deemed appropriate for sex classifications. 
Thus, rather than seeing modern equal protection jurisprudence as a novel 
departure from pre–New Deal classical liberalism, it is better conceived as a 
modern liberal reinterpretation of the jurisprudence that the Supreme Court 
adopted in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. If anything, this 
understanding is reinforced by such recent decisions as Romer v. Evans61 and 
United States v. Windsor,62 where the Supreme Court, taking Justice Kennedy’s 
lead, has in practice ignored the tiered-scrutiny approach that would have 
required extremely deferential rational basis review.63 Instead, the Court has 
applied a standard akin to the Old Court’s class-legislation methodology:64 If the 
government is classifying people for arbitrary reasons not clearly related to any 
legitimate government interest, then the law violates the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
Moreover, as minority groups have gone from being “discrete and insular”65 
to wielding substantial political power, the Court has resisted attempts to 
weaken its standard of review for racial classifications that favor certain 
minority groups.66 Liberal arguments can be made for racial and ethnic 
preferences in limited circumstances. Nevertheless, a race-neutral strict scrutiny 
standard of review for racial classifications seems broadly consistent with the 
classical-liberal principles of prohibiting government from drawing arbitrary 
 
 61.   517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 62.  See generally 133 S. Ct. 1512 (2013). 
 63.  See Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
945, 948 (2004) (discussing how the Court has deviated from its official tiers of scrutiny). 
 64.  See Ernest A. Young & Erin C. Blondel, Federalism, Liberty, and Equality in United States v. 
Windsor, 2013 CATO SUP. CT. REV.117, 139–40; Jack Balkin, Windsor and the Constitutional 
Prohibition on Class Legislation, BALKINIZATION (June 26, 2013), http://balkin.blogspot.com/ 
2013/06/windsor-and-constitutional-prohibition.html.  
 65.  United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 66.  See Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2433 (2013).  
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distinctions between its citizens and avoiding dangerous concentrations of 
power in the hands of government.67 
IV 
MODERN “SUBSTANTIVE” DUE PROCESS68 
The Supreme Court’s modern “substantive” due process decisions also have 
direct antecedents in pre–New Deal classical-liberal jurisprudence. Although 
some have argued that the pre–New Deal due process decisions were grounded 
in class legislation concerns,69 after Lochner, these decisions primarily involved 
the Court trying to protect the fundamental rights of the American people from 
oppressive government regulations.70 The terminology has changed over the 
decades—it is very unusual for modern judges to speak of natural rights, and 
“state interests” have replaced “police powers” as justifications for challenged 
legislation—but the basic idea is the same. 
In the early post-Reconstruction period, the Supreme Court held that, to the 
extent the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provided any 
substantive protection against government overreach, it primarily, or perhaps 
exclusively, protected individuals from class legislation.71 The Supreme Court 
interpreted the due process prohibition on class legislation quite narrowly, 
allowing, for example, obvious special interest legislation banning the 
production of margarine at the behest of dairy farmers.72 A series of challenges 
to labor regulation based on class legislation arguments failed in the late 1890s 
and early 1900s.73 
The Court soon replaced class legislation analysis in due process cases with a 
focus on the liberty interest presented by the party challenging allegedly 
arbitrary legislation.74 Indeed, by 1905, the Supreme Court explicitly questioned 
 
 67.  See David E. Bernstein, Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action and the Failed 
Attempt to Square a Circle, 8 NYU J. L. & LIB. 210 (2014).  
 68.  As applied to the pre–New Deal Court, the phrase “substantive due process” is anachronistic, 
as courts did not explicitly distinguish between the substantive and procedural aspects of due process. 
See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 103–04 (2d ed. 1998); James W. Ely, Jr., Reflections on Buchanan v. Warley, 
Property Rights, and Race, 51 VAND. L. REV. 953, 956 (1998); Gary D. Rowe, Lochner Revisionism 
Revisited, 24 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 221, 244 (1999). See also G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION 
AND THE NEW DEAL 245 (2000) (explaining that it was not until the 1950s that jurisprudence under the 
Due Process Clause was separated into by courts and legal scholars into “substantive” and 
“procedural” categories). 
 69.  See, e.g., Gillman, supra note 34 (arguing this position at length).  
 70.  See Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised, supra note 31, at 15. 
 71.   In Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 124 (1889), the Supreme Court even declared that the 
absence of arbitrary classification defeatsnot just successful equal protection claims against regulatory 
legislation, but due process claims as well. 
 72.  Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 679 (1888). 
 73.  See generally Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207 (1903); St. Louis Cons. Coal Co. v. Illinois, 185 
U.S. 203, 207 (1902); Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U.S. 13, 22 (1901); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 
366 (1898).  
 74.  See BERNSTEIN,  REHABILITATING LOCHNER, supra note 3, at ch. 1. 
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whether the guarantee of due process of the law applied to class legislation at 
all.75 The Court eventually concluded that it did, but that the Due Process 
Clause only provided a “mere minimum” of protection against unequal 
legislation.76 
A key doctrinal turning point was the 1898 case of Allgeyer v. Louisiana.77 In 
Allgeyer, the Supreme Court stated that the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
protection of liberty from arbitrary deprivation included  
the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties, to be free to use 
them in all lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his livelihood by any 
lawful calling, to pursue any livelihood or avocation; and for that purpose to enter into 
all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a 
successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned. 78  
In Lochner v. New York,79 however, the majority almost entirely ignored the 
class legislation issue even though both the lower court rulings and Lochner’s 
brief had focused on it. Instead, the Court focused on the right to liberty of 
contract protected by the Due Process Clause.80 
Allgeyer and Lochner established the Due Process Clause as a fertile source 
for the protection of liberty rights against the states.81 However, the scope of 
these rights seemed limited. For almost two decades, the Supreme Court, as in 
Allgeyer and Lochner, only enforced protections for liberty of contract and 
property rights.82 These rights, moreover, could be overcome by the government 
upon showing that the challenged laws fell within its “police powers,” which 
were in turn somewhat amorphous and subject to idiosyncratic and, at times, 
inconsistent judicial definition. 
Eventually, however, the Court expanded the scope of due process 
protections. In Meyer v. Nebraska83 in 1923, the Court invalidated a Nebraska 
statute banning the teaching of foreign languages to children. The Court stated 
that the Due Process Clause protects not just economic rights, but the rights “to 
acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to 
worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to 
enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly 
pursuit of happiness by free men.”84 The Court proceeded to use the Clause to 
invalidate laws banning private schools and restricting the teaching of the 
Japanese language.85 The Court also held that the Clause protects freedom of 
 
 75.  E.g., District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S. 138, 142 (1909). 
 76.  Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 331–32 (1921). 
 77.  165 U.S. 578 (1897). 
 78.  Id. at 589. 
 79.  See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  
 80.  Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised, supra note 31, at 25–26. 
 81.  Id. at 28. 
 82.  More precisely, Allgeyer only enforced the right “to contract outside of the state.” Allgeyer, 
165 U.S. at 587. Lochner enforced a broader right to liberty of contract. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 51.  
 83.  Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923). 
 84.  Id. at 399. 
 85.  Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298 (1927).  
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expression, and began to invalidate state laws restricting freedom of speech. 
These cases are often incorrectly described as “incorporation” cases; in fact, 
they do not mention the First Amendment, but instead rely solely on the Due 
Process Clause. 
Meanwhile, the Court held in several cases that even valid police-power 
rationales could not save legislation that violated fundamental rights.86 In 
Buchanan v. Warley,87 the Court invalidated a Louisville, Kentucky residential 
segregation law as a violation of the Due Process Clause. The Court 
acknowledged that Kentucky had asserted at least two valid police-power 
rationales for the law, including limiting interracial violence. The Court held 
that the law was nevertheless “not a legitimate exercise of the police power of 
the State, and is in direct violation of the fundamental law enacted in the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution preventing state interference with 
property rights except by due process of law.”88 
Six years later, in Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court acknowledged that 
Nebraska had a legitimate interest in ensuring that the children of the state 
become fluent in English.89 The law banning the teaching of foreign languages 
was still held unconstitutional, however, “because a desirable end cannot be 
promoted by prohibited means.”90 Similarly, in Farrington v. Tokushige, the 
Court acknowledged the government’s legitimate interest in encouraging 
Japanese assimilation in Hawaii, but still held that a law banning Japanese-
language instruction violated due process rights.91 
Given longstanding Progressive hostility to the use of the Due Process 
Clause to protect substantive rights, one could reasonably have expected the 
Court to overrule all of these precedents as soon as a majority could be cobbled 
together to overturn Lochner and its progeny. Instead, in Palko v. Connecticut, 
the Court’s new Progressive-liberal majority suggested that some of the rights in 
the Bill of Rights might be worthy of due process protection,92 and in Carolene 
Products’ footnote four the Court suggested that government infringement on 
certain “fundamental rights” might require extra judicial scrutiny.93 
For the next twenty-five years or so, the Court rejected opportunities to 
protect substantive rights directly via the Due Process Clause. In particular, in 
Skinner v. Oklahoma,94 it relied on an equal protection argument instead of a 
liberty argument to invalidate a law requiring sterilization of certain prisoners. 
 
 86.  For additional discussion, see David E. Bernstein, The Conservative Origins of Strict Scrutiny, 
19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 861 (2012). 
 87.  245 U.S. 60 (1917).  
 88.  Id. at 82.  
 89.  262 U.S. at 396. 
 90.  Id. at 401. 
 91.  Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298 (1927). 
 92.  Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
 93.  United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 94.   See generally 316 U.S. 535 (1942).  
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In Bolling v. Sharpe,95 objections from Justice Hugo Black forced Chief Justice 
Earl Warren to edit a ruling holding public-school segregation in D.C. to violate 
“substantive” due process standards into a somewhat incoherent mush.96 
During the same post–World War II period, the Court gradually adopted 
the incorporation doctrine, holding that some of the rights protected by the Bill 
of Rights were “incorporated” in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause. Though the Court denied it, the incorporation cases were themselves a 
species of “substantive” due process because they protected substantive rights 
via the Due Process Clause. And although the origins of the incorporation 
doctrine are sometimes incorrectly attributed to Progressive Justice Louis 
Brandeis,97 the first advocate of incorporation was actually Justice John 
Marshall Harlan.98 Harlan’s overall jurisprudential philosophy is a bit obscure. 
He was, however, at least a classical-liberal fellow traveler, as he supported the 
right to liberty of contract99 and believed in natural rights.100 
Some old-school Progressives, notably an elderly Learned Hand, objected to 
the Warren Court’s nascent use of the Due Process Clause to protect rights. 
Hand criticized the Court’s incorporation doctrine in general, and the 
incorporation of the First Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause in particular. He contended that there is “no constitutional 
basis” for the Court to exercise any more supervision over state and local 
regulation of freedom of expression than it did over liberty of contract.101 
 
 95.  Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
 96.  See generally David E. Bernstein, Bolling, Equal Protection, Due Process, and Lochnerphobia, 
93 GEO. L.J. 1253 (2004).  
 97.  See MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS 641 (2009). 
 98.  See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 114–27 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Hurtado v. 
California, 110 U.S. 516, 540–41 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Road to 
Twining: Reassessing the Disincorporation of the Bill of Rights, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1457, 1459 (2000). 
 99.  See generally Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (Harlan, J.) (invalidating a law in part 
because it violated the right to liberty of contract).  
 100.  Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239, 252 (1905) (stating that 
there are limitations on all organs of government which “grow[] out of the essential nature of all free 
governments”). See also Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U.S. 177, 195 (1910); Berea 
College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 68 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
[T]he right to enjoy one’s religious belief, unmolested by any human power, is no more sacred 
nor more fully or distinctly recognized than is the right to impart and receive instruction not 
harmful to the public. The denial of either right would be an infringement of the liberty 
inherent in the freedom secured by the fundamental law. 
Id.  
See also Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905) (Harlan, J.) (“There is, of course, a sphere 
within which the individual may assert the supremacy of his own will and rightfully dispute the 
authority of any human government—especially of any free government existing under a written 
constitution, to interfere with the exercise of that will.”); Chi., B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 
238 (1897) (Harlan, J.) (stating that compensation for the taking of property for public use is a “settled 
principle of universal law, reaching back of all constitutional provisions”). See generally MILTON R. 
KONVITZ, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: HISTORY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 38–40 (2001) (noting 
Harlan’s influence on the development of natural rights jurisprudence on the Supreme Court in the 
years leading up to Lochner). 
 101.   LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS  50–51, 56 (1958). 
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Hand and other critics, however, failed to slow the embrace of a broad 
reading of the Due Process Clause. A speed bump arose in the form of a 1963 
opinion upholding a ban on debt adjustment by nonlawyers.102 Justice Black, 
who believed that the “substantive” aspect of the Due Process Clause should be 
wholly limited to incorporating the Bill of Rights, wrote for the Court that “a 
state legislature can do whatever it sees fit to do unless it is restrained by some 
express prohibition in the Constitution.”103 
Just two years later, though, in Griswold v. Connecticut,104 the Supreme 
Court (over a strong dissent from Justice Black) enforced an unenumerated 
right via the Due Process Clause for the first time since 1936. Four different 
Justices in the majority wrote opinions in Griswold, and all of them cited the 
pre–New Deal opinions of Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters105 
in support of finding a fundamental right to privacy under the Due Process 
Clause. The main opinion for the Court, written by Justice William O. Douglas, 
denied that the Court was utilizing “substantive” due process. Rather, Douglas 
argued, the opinion was akin to incorporation, because it relied on the 
“penumbras, formed by emanations” from rights protected by the Bill of 
Rights.106 Fifty years later, it seems fair to say that Douglas fooled no one but 
(perhaps) himself. 
Over the ensuing decades, the Court recognized other fundamental rights, 
including the right to terminate a pregnancy107 and the right to marry.108 At first, 
the Court enforced a strict dichotomy: A right was either “fundamental,” and 
infringements on it were subject to strict scrutiny, or a right was 
nonfundamental, and protected only by the rational basis test. The Court has 
eroded this dichotomy, however, by adopting a unique “undue burden” test for 
abortion regulations,109 by refusing to articulate the standard of review that 
applies to laws infringing on the fundamental right to control the upbringing of 
one’s children,110 and by protecting the right to engage in homosexual sex 
without recognizing it as a fundamental right.111 Modern substantive due process 
jurisprudence, then, has not only always had its antecedents in pre–New Deal 
classical-liberal jurisprudence, but has, over time, become more similar to how 
that jurisprudence operates in practice—judges weigh the importance of the 
right against the government’s purported interest in infringement. Two big 
chasms between substantive due process jurisprudence in 1913 and 2013 
nevertheless remain. First, the Court no longer recognizes pure “moral” 
 
 102.  Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). 
 103.  Id. at 729. 
 104.  381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 105.  268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 106.  Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484–85. 
 107.  See generally Roe v. Wade, 401 U.S. 113 (1973).  
 108.  See generally Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 109.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 837 (1992). 
 110.  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 111.  See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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concerns as valid rationales for infringement on rights. Second, the Court 
refuses to give economic rights any significant protection. But the point is not 
that modern substantive due process jurisprudence is the same as the pre–New 
Deal Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence. Rather, the point is that 
the modern doctrine is a direct descendant of, and is significantly influenced by, 
the old doctrine. 
V 
FEDERALISM 
At first glance, the libertarian approach to issues of constitutional 
federalism has little in common with either modern liberal constitutional theory 
or with the position taken by the modern Supreme Court. Most modern liberal 
constitutional theorists generally advocate nearly unconstrained federal power, 
especially when it comes to making regulations that might affect the national 
economy in any significant way.112 Others go even farther, and argue that 
federalism questions should be left entirely to the political process,113 or at least 
subject to very heavy judicial deference. 
Over the last twenty years, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have enforced 
some modest limits on the scope of Congress’s power under the Commerce 
Clause114 and have interpreted the Tenth Amendment to constrain Congress’s 
power to commandeer the states.115 Most recently, in the Affordable Care Act 
case, a majority of Justices ruled that there are important constraints on 
Congress’s power to impose mandates under both the Commerce Clause and 
the Necessary and Proper Clause.116 The Court has also enforced limits on the 
scope of congressional enforcement power under Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and Section Two of the Fifteenth Amendment.117 But 
all of these decisions were closely contested 5-4 or 6-3 rulings, and most liberal 
scholars and jurists reject them. Moreover, they do not go nearly as far in 
constraining federal power as libertarian constitutional theorists would like. 
Although the Court has not gone as far as libertarians have wanted it to, in 
recent years it has embraced several key ideas that have been championed by 
libertarian critics of the post–New Deal consensus on federalism. Similarly, 
 
 112.  See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 30, at ch. 9; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, ENHANCING GOVERNMENT: 
FEDERALISM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2008).  
 113.  For leading statements of this view, see generally JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND 
THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE 
SUPREME COURT (1980); Herbert J. Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the 
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). 
 114.  See, e.g., Morrison v. United States, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 
(1995). 
 115.  See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 
166 (1992). 
 116.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,132 S. Ct. 2566, 2572 (2012).  
 117.  See, e.g., Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013) (enforcing limits on congressional 
power under Section Two of the Fifteenth Amendment); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 
(1997) (enforcing limits  on congressional power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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there are important commonalities between the libertarian approach to 
federalism questions and the mainstream liberal approach to other issues of 
structural constitutional law—most notably, separation of powers. 
 A. Libertarianism and the Revival of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism 
In the 1930s and 1940s, the New Deal Supreme Court issued a series of 
decisions severely reducing judicial enforcement of constitutional limits on the 
scope of congressional power, particularly the Commerce Clause and the 
Spending Clause. The Court ruled that Congress has the power to regulate 
almost any activity that affects interstate commerce,118 and also held that there 
are few judicially enforceable limits on its power to allocate federal funds under 
the General Welfare Clause.119 In the aftermath of the New Deal transformation 
of constitutional law, the conventional wisdom among most jurists and legal 
scholars was that the courts should defer to the political branches of 
government when it comes to federalism questions. That conventional wisdom 
was reinforced by the civil rights revolution of the 1960s, when the banner of 
“states’ rights” was used to defend Jim Crow segregation, and expansive federal 
power was needed to break the southern states’ resistance to the establishment 
of equal rights for African Americans. 
From the New Deal period until well into the 1980s, libertarian 
constitutional theorists who argued that the judiciary should enforce tight limits 
on federal power, such as Richard Epstein,120 were severely out of step with the 
legal mainstream. Over the last twenty-five years, however, the Rehnquist and 
Roberts Courts have revived the idea of judicial enforcement of limits on 
federal power and have helped make it intellectually respectable again.121 
During the same period, libertarian legal scholars such as Randy Barnett, Gary 
Lawson, and Michael Greve have deepened and expanded the libertarian 
critique of the dominant post–New Deal approach to federalism.122 
The Court has not gone nearly as far as libertarian constitutional theorists 
would like in limiting federal power. Scholars such as Epstein and Barnett 
would prefer to reverse many of the core New Deal decisions and restore much 
of the pre-1930s’ understanding of the scope of federal power.123 But the Court 
 
 118.  See generally Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).  
 119.  See, e.g., Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 
548, 606 (1937). 
 120.  See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Mistakes of 1937, 11 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 5, 6 (1988); 
Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1388 (1987).  
 121.  For an overview of that revival and its causes, see Ilya Somin, The Impact of Judicial Review 
on American Federalism: Promoting Centralization More than State Autonomy, in COURTS IN 
FEDERAL COUNTRIES: FEDERALISTS OR UNITARISTS? (Nicholas Aroney & John Kincaid, eds.) 
(forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2311400.  
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has endorsed several of the most important precepts long advocated by 
libertarian scholars. 
At the most basic level, the Court has emphasized that there are meaningful 
limits to federal power, and the courts have a duty to enforce them. Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s 1995 opinion in Lopez v. United States—the first to strike 
down a statute as beyond the bounds of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority 
in nearly sixty years—begins with the “first principle [that] [t]he Constitution 
creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers,” and that it is the task of 
the judiciary to enforce those limitations.124 This is a direct repudiation of New 
Deal–inspired notions that structural limits on the scope of congressional power 
are left up to the discretion of the political process. Later decisions such as 
Morrison v. United States and NFIB v. Sebelius have reinforced that conclusion. 
The Court’s enforcement limits on federal power remain very limited. For 
example, the Court continues to apply the highly deferential rational basis test 
on the question of whether an “economic activity” that Congress seeks to 
regulate has a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce such that it can use 
the commerce power.125 
On the other hand, the Court has not been similarly deferential in 
addressing the question of whether a given object of regulation is an economic 
activity in the first place. Most notably, in NFIB v. Sebelius, five Justices 
concluded that failure to purchase health insurance is actually “inactivity” 
outside the scope of the Commerce Clause and thus not subject to 
congressional mandates, despite its significant impact on commerce.126 If the 
Court need not defer to Congress in determining whether a regulated activity 
(or inactivity) qualifies as economic, this is a potentially significant limitation on 
the scope of congressional power. So far, it has not been so, in part because the 
Court has defined economic activity broadly, as anything involving “the 
production, distribution, and consumption of commodities.”127 Nonetheless, the 
lack of judicial deference on this issue gives the Court the option of retreating 
from that definition in the future. 
An additional theme of libertarian constitutionalism that has been 
embraced by the Supreme Court is the idea that the limitation of federal power 
is important to the preservation of individual liberty.128 In Bond v. United States, 
Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote an opinion for a unanimous Court which held 
that “[s]tates are not the sole intended beneficiaries of federalism,” because 
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 126.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,132 S.Ct. 2566, 2580–94 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.).   
 127.  Raich, 545 U.S. at 25–26 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720 
(1966)). 
 128.  For libertarian assertions of this idea, see generally BARNETT, supra note 2; EPSTEIN, supra 
note 123. 
BERNSTEIN_SOMIN_EIC (DO NOT DELETE) 1/31/2015  12:14 PM 
62 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 77:43 
“[f]ederalism secures the freedom of the individual” as well as the prerogatives 
of state governments.129 The link between judicial enforcement of federalism 
and individual liberty is now a sufficiently mainstream idea that even liberal 
Supreme Court justices are willing to sign on to it, albeit only to a limited 
degree. 
The link between federalism and liberty was also a recurring theme in the 
opinions of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, a key swing-vote Justice on the 
Rehnquist Court. In the important 1992 case of New York v. United States, her 
majority opinion clearly emphasized that “[s]tate officials cannot consent to the 
enlargement of the powers of Congress beyond those enumerated in the 
Constitution” in part because constitutional federalism exists for the benefit of 
“the people,” not the states alone.130 In Gregory v. Ashcroft, she wrote that “[i]n 
the tension between federal and state power lies the promise of liberty.”131 The 
Court drew these ideas from the classical-liberal thought of the Founding 
Fathers more than from modern libertarianism.132 But obviously the latter has 
its intellectual origins in the former, and both are at odds with the New Deal 
view that limitations on federal power have little—if any—value in protecting 
individual freedom. 
Less recognized than the above two connections between libertarian 
constitutional thought on federalism and the Court’s jurisprudence is the 
latter’s endorsement of the idea that state consent does not justify the 
expansion of federal power into otherwise unconstitutional realms. This precept 
is a logical extension of the related precept that constitutional limits on federal 
power are supposed to benefit the people, not just state governments. 
A majority of the Court endorsed the theory as early as 1992, in New York 
v. United States, where Justice O’Connor ruled that state consent was not 
enough to justify otherwise impermissible federal “commandeering” of state 
governments. O’Connor wrote for the majority that “powerful incentives might 
lead both federal and state officials to view departures from the federal 
structure to be in their personal interests.”133 If limits on federal power are 
meant to protect individual liberty, not just the interests of state governments, it 
follows that judicial enforcement may often be needed, because the states 
cannot be trusted to defend federalism in the political process in cases where it 
does not serve their own purposes, but does protect individual freedom. This 
point is a central precept of modern libertarian theories of federalism 
jurisprudence.134 More generally, if the states often have an interest in 
expanding federal power beyond its constitutional bounds, then their political 
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power cannot be a justification for judicial deference to Congress. 
Overall, there is a large gap between the Court’s current federalism 
jurisprudence and where most libertarians would want it to be. So far, the 
revival of federalism under the Rehnquist and Roberts courts has had only very 
modest results. However, a majority of the Court has embraced three key 
precepts of libertarian constitutional thought: (1) that the judiciary must 
enforce structural limits on federal power, (2) that such limits promote 
individual liberty as well as the interests of state governments, and (3) that state 
consent cannot alone justify expansions of federal power because state 
governments often have interests that diverge from those of the general public. 
 B. The Libertarian View of Federalism and the Progressive View of 
Separation of Powers 
Although the libertarian approach to constitutional federalism has arguably 
converged with that of the Supreme Court majority in some important respects, 
the same cannot be said with respect to most left-liberal academics’ and jurists’ 
views of federalism. With rare exceptions, progressive scholars and judges have 
rejected nearly all recent efforts to promote judicial enforcement of structural 
limits on congressional power.135 It may be a long time, if ever, before there is 
any substantial convergence between left-liberal and libertarian constitutional 
thought on this issue. 
There is, however, an important congruence between the way libertarians 
view federalism issues and the way progressives approach other structural 
questions in constitutional law. Although most of the latter are hostile to 
judicial enforcement of federalism, many of them support aggressive 
enforcement of separation of powers constraints on executive power. 
The liberal justices on the Supreme Court and most left-of-center academics 
supported the Court’s decisions to limit executive power to detain and 
interrogate suspected terrorists during the war on terror.136 In the most recent of 
these cases, Boumediene v. Bush, in 2008,137 the Court restricted the President’s 
exercise of detention authority even though he had congressional authorization. 
Modern liberal constitutional theorists have defended these decisions and 
have urged tighter judicial constraints on the exercise of executive power 
because they recognize that the political process–including Congress–is often 
unable or unwilling to curb presidential power grabs, especially in a time of 
crisis.138 Bruce Ackerman has even argued for the creation of a new specialized 
 
 135.  For example, the liberal justices on the court consistently voted against limitations on federal 
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 137.  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 729–30 (2008). 
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court intended to rein in executive power, for fear that the Supreme Court, as 
presently constituted, is unlikely to be forceful enough.139 
These liberal scholars and jurists offer a critique of unconstrained executive 
power similar to the libertarian critique of unconstrained congressional power. 
Both groups argue that the political process cannot be trusted to constrain 
abuses on its own because of perverse incentives.140 Accordingly, both are also 
willing to support judicial intervention even though the political branches of 
government may have superior information and expertise. The disparity 
between the judiciary’s and the political branches’ knowledge may actually be 
greater in the realm of wartime issues than domestic policymaking, because the 
former often involves complex classified intelligence data that cannot be 
publicized. Furthermore, both libertarians and liberals argue that judicial 
enforcement of structural constraints on government power is essential to 
preserve not only the institutional prerogatives of different branches and levels 
of government, but individual liberty.141 If presidents can abuse an 
unconstrained power to detain and surveil, so too can Congress abuse an 
unconstrained power to regulate and mandate. 
Finally, both the modern liberal approach to executive power and the 
modern conservative approach to federalism represent important breaks with 
New Deal–era orthodoxy. New Deal jurists and constitutional theorists were, 
for the most part, comfortable with a high degree of judicial deference to the 
executive, especially in wartime.142 For example, a Supreme Court dominated by 
Roosevelt-appointed New Dealers held, in one of the Japanese internment 
cases, that “[s]ince the Constitution commits to the Executive and to Congress 
the exercise of the war power in all the vicissitudes and conditions of warfare, it 
has necessarily given them wide scope for the exercise of judgment and 
discretion in determining the nature and extent of the threatened injury or 
danger and in the selection of the means for resisting it . . . Where, as they did 
here, the conditions call for the exercise of judgment and discretion and for the 
choice of means by those branches of the Government on which the 
Constitution has placed the responsibility of warmaking, it is not for any court 
to sit in review of the wisdom of their action or substitute it judgment for 
theirs.”143 Few liberal jurists or constitutional scholars would endorse these 
words today. 
With a few exceptions, libertarian constitutional theorists have recognized 
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the important parallels between abuses of executive power and unconstitutional 
congressional overreach. For example, Randy Barnett has taken a leading role 
in challenging expansive National Security Agency surveillance that is 
purportedly justified by the exigencies of the war on terror.144 
This is not to suggest that it is impossible to draw meaningful distinctions 
between executive and congressional overreach. Obviously, many liberals 
believe there are differences that justify greater judicial intervention in the 
former area, whereas many conservatives believe the opposite. Our point is not 
that such distinctions are inherently invalid, but that there are also strong 
parallels between the two areas. These parallels could potentially lead to a 
measure of convergence between liberal and libertarian views on structural 
constitutional law. 
For the moment, such convergence seems unlikely. But it is worth noting 
that, over the last twenty years, the Supreme Court majority has expanded both 
its efforts to enforce federalism constraints on Congress and its oversight of the 
use of wartime executive power. In both cases, some critics argue that it has not 
gone nearly far enough, while others contend that even the modest steps taken 
so far are excessive. The arguments offered for and against both of these moves 
are strikingly similar. That may be part of the reason why key swing-voter 
Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and Anthony Kennedy consistently voted with 
the majority in both cases limiting federal power and cases limiting wartime 
executive power. That similarity may, over time, be more widely appreciated. 
VI 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 
In few areas is the difference between libertarian and liberal views of 
constitutional law more readily apparent than in the field of property rights. For 
many decades beginning in the late 1930s, property rights were the “poor 
relation” of constitutional law, as the Supreme Court famously put it in 1994.145 
That the judiciary should abjure protection of property rights was one of the 
central tenets of New Deal liberal jurisprudence, and a major focus of 
Progressive criticisms of the old, pre–New Deal era Court.146 
The post–New Deal conventional wisdom on property rights was epitomized 
by the Supreme Court’s 1954 decision in Berman v. Parker,147 which interpreted 
the Fifth Amendment’s requirement that property can only be condemned for a 
“public use” nearly out of existence, holding that once the “legislature has 
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spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive.”148 
During this era, the Court also took a very narrow view of what kinds of 
government regulations qualify as takings requiring compensation under the 
Fifth Amendment’s Just Compensation Clause.149 
Since the mid-1980s, however, the Court has begun to revive judicial 
protection of property rights under the Fifth Amendment in a variety of ways. 
In a series of decisions, it has increased the range of government actions that 
qualify as takings.150 Most recently, in a controversial ruling in Koontz v. St. 
Johns River Water Management District,151 it significantly broadened the 
application of takings analysis to land-use permit schemes.152 
These decisions have not gone nearly as far as libertarian advocates of 
property rights would like.153 In many ways, the Court continues to treat 
property rights less favorably than other enumerated constitutional rights.154 But 
recent decisions do represent a significant change from the immediate post–
New Deal era, and a challenge to the Progressive and New Deal orthodoxy. 
At least for the moment, the Court continues to endorse a very broad 
conception of what qualifies as a public use. In the highly controversial 2005 
case of Kelo v. City of New London,155 the Court ruled that “economic 
development” by a private firm is enough to legitimate a taking and reaffirmed 
the idea that virtually any public benefit qualifies as a public use—the 
government need not even prove that the supposed benefit will actually be 
achieved.156 But it is significant that Kelo was a close 5-4 decision, with key 
swing-vote Justice Sandra Day O’Connor authoring a forceful dissent, joined by 
three other justices, arguing that the Public Use Clause authorizes strong 
judicial review and that private economic development is not a permissible 
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public use.157 In a solo dissent, Justice Clarence Thomas outlined an even more 
extensive challenge to the post–New Deal Court’s ultradeferential public use 
jurisprudence.158 Justice Anthony Kennedy, the swing voter in the case, 
authored a concurring opinion that suggested that heightened scrutiny of 
condemnations that transfer property to private parties might be appropriate in 
some cases where there was sufficient evidence of “favoritism” towards private 
interests.159 Even the majority opinion written by Justice John Paul Stevens was 
slightly less deferential to the government than previous precedent had been.160 
If nothing else, the close result in Kelo shattered the previous consensus 
among experts, who viewed the broad post–New Deal view of public use as 
nearly unchallengeable orthodoxy that was both clearly correct and firmly 
established.161 If any Justices epitomize the constitutional mainstream of the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first century, it is perennial Supreme Court swing-
voters O’Connor and Kennedy. The fact that that one of them decisively 
repudiated the equation of public use and potential public benefit, while the 
other at least raised questions about its validity, is a powerful sign of the erosion 
of the New Deal consensus on constitutional property rights issues. In the 
aftermath of Kelo, that consensus was further weakened by the refusal of 
several state supreme courts to adopt Kelo as a guide to the public use clauses 
of their state constitutions, and. by extensive disagreement among state and 
lower federal courts over the question of what qualifies as a “pretextual” taking. 
Under Kelo, pretextual takings are considered violations of the Public Use 
Clause because the official rationale for the condemnation in such cases is a 
mere pretext “for the purpose of conferring a private benefit on a particular 
private party.”162 
Outside the judiciary, Kelo led to a nearly unprecedented political backlash, 
with public opinion polls showing some eighty percent of Americans opposed to 
the decision, and some forty-five states enacting eminent domain–reform laws 
in response to the ruling—a more extensive legislative reaction than that which 
resulted from any other Supreme Court decision.163 
The political reaction to Kelo indicates the potential for a degree of 
convergence between libertarians and liberals on constitutional property rights 
issues. While most property rights cases divide observers along ideological lines, 
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with libertarians and conservatives supporting property rights and liberals 
tending to support the government, numerous liberal commentators, activists, 
and organizations were among those condemning Kelo and filing amicus briefs 
urging the Court to strike down economic development takings. They included 
the NAACP, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (a prominent 
mostly African-American civil rights group), and left-wing activist Ralph 
Nader.164 One of the present authors, a libertarian law professor, filed an amicus 
brief on behalf of legendary left-of-center urban development theorist Jane 
Jacobs.165 
Opposition to Kelo from the left was driven by, among other things, a 
recognition that economic development and “blight condemnations” often 
target the poor, the politically weak, and racial minorities for the purpose of 
transferring their property to politically connected developers and other 
influential interest groups.166 Other property rights issues do not necessarily 
have the same valence. But their distributional consequences are nonetheless 
often more complex than the traditional New Deal worldview might suggest. 
Often, they involve government regulations that benefit well-connected interest 
groups at the expense of the general public, even if they do not necessarily 
involve straightforward “reverse Robin Hood” transfers from the poor to the 
affluent.167 
It is unlikely that libertarian and liberal views on constitutional property 
rights will ever completely converge, or even that they will become as close as 
the two groups’ views on “noneconomic” rights. Libertarians support strong 
protection for property rights even in cases where government restrictions on 
them do not inflict harm on the poor and disadvantaged, while liberals are 
unlikely to go that far. But the interesting anti-Kelo coalition suggests the 
possibility that the differences between the two might narrow. 
So far, liberal opposition to Kelo has not, for the most part, affected 
attitudes among left-of-center federal judges and prominent legal scholars, most 
of whom tend to support the result in Kelo and continue to endorse the 
extremely broad view of public use outlined in the Court’s pre-Kelo 
jurisprudence. But that may eventually change over time. The next generation 
of progressive federal judges and legal scholars might include a higher 
proportion whose views on public use resemble those of Jacobs, Nader, and the 
NAACP. 
Finally, convergence between liberal and libertarian views of constitutional 
property rights might occur because the extremely deferential New Deal 
approach to property rights is at odds with the dominant liberal view of most 
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other constitutional rights. In contrast to many early twentieth-century 
Progressives,168 modern liberals generally support strong judicial enforcement of 
a wide range of individual rights, including freedom of speech, privacy rights, 
rights against racial and gender discrimination, and the rights of criminal 
defendants. In this context, extensive deference on property rights issues seems 
an unusual anomaly. As James Ely points out with respect to the Public Use 
Clause, “among all the guarantees of the Bill of Rights, only the public use 
limitation is singled out for heavy [judicial] deference.”169 
If liberal scholars and jurists were to treat property rights protected by the 
Takings Clause the same way as they treat other constitutional rights, they 
would still not necessarily grant these rights as much protection as libertarians 
claim they should. After all, liberals, like conservatives, often prefer to give 
government greater scope relative to individual liberty in a wide range of areas 
where libertarians would prefer tighter constraints. But it would significantly 
diminish the gap between the two camps. 
Obviously, such convergence is by no means inevitable. As memories of 
Kelo fade, liberals could potentially reunite in defense of New Deal–era 
orthodoxy. Alternatively, libertarian constitutionalism could gradually fade as a 
significant, distinct movement in constitutional thought and return to the fringe 
obscurity it was consigned to in the decades immediately following the Great 
Depression. It is also possible that the two sides’ views of property rights will 
remain as deeply divided as they are today. 
Be that as it may, it is clear that the Supreme Court, over the last several 
decades, has gradually brought some key libertarian ideas on property rights 
back into the mainstream, and there is some potential for convergence between 
libertarian and liberal approaches to these issues. That potential is highlighted 
by the reactions of many in both groups to the Kelo case and by the anomalous 
status of property rights in modern liberal constitutional thought. 
While libertarian theories of constitutional property rights have gained 
ground in recent years, it is only fair to note that libertarian efforts to 
strengthen judicial protection for economic liberties such as freedom of contract 
have attracted far less support. Lochner v. New York,170 the 1905 case that 
symbolizes judicial protection for such rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, continues to be one of the most reviled Supreme Court decisions 
of all time, in the eyes of mainstream jurists and liberal academics. The modern 
Court has so far not chosen to revisit the ultra-deferential approach to 
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restrictions on economic freedom adopted in Williamson v. Lee Optical.171 
Libertarian scholars who seek to challenge the dominant view on judicial 
protection for economic liberties have achieved only very limited success.172 
Still, several lower court decisions have recently struck down particularly 
egregious licensing restrictions as violating the Fourteenth Amendment, a 
development which suggests that the deferential “rational basis” test that 
currently applies to economic regulations may over time develop “bite.”173 In 
addition, libertarian defenses of judicial protection for economic liberty are now 
taken seriously in academic and jurisprudential circles to a much greater extent 
than was the case twenty or thirty years ago. It is possible that libertarian legal 
thought in this area may follow the same gradual path towards mainstream 
influence as it already has in the field of property rights. 
VII 
CONCLUSION 
Libertarian constitutionalism is likely to remain a small minority movement 
among jurists and legal scholars for the foreseeable future. But libertarian ideas 
nonetheless have had significant influence on modern Supreme Court 
jurisprudence. With respect to noneconomic liberties and equal protection of 
the law, modern jurisprudence has adopted, albeit in modified form, a 
surprising number of doctrines that originated in the supposedly benighted pre–
New Deal period. With regard to federalism and property rights, there is a 
much larger gap between libertarian ideas and dominant precedent, and an 
even bigger one between libertarian views and those of left-liberal 
constitutional theorists. Nonetheless, libertarian ideas have made some progress 
within the Court in recent years. And, as the Kelo case dramatically 
demonstrated, there are also important commonalities between libertarian and 
liberal legal thought in these fields—commonalities that create some potential 
for convergence. 
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